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INTRODUCTION 
IS CULTURAL CRITICISM POSSIBLE?t 
James Boyd White* 
I 
It is by now something of a truism that the abstract and conceptual 
modes of discourse that have dominated our intellectual life in the past 
century have led to a rather reduced and schematic view of law. 
Moved by the desire to talk about social institutions in a neutral and 
scientific way, scholars beginning at least with John Austin have 
sought to define law as a set of rules, promulgated by a sovereign and 
addressed to the behavior of subject individuals, all in an attempt to 
isolate legal phenomena from their context for scientific study. Rules, 
on this view, are seen to speak in terms of classes: any person who 
performs act A is said to be exposed to consequence B. For the pur-
pose of law so regarded, all that matters is the stereotyped narrative 
which it establishes as a condition for the legal consequence it imposes. 
The law takes a snapshot of the world and reduces human actors and 
events to the set of caricatures by which it interprets what it sees. The 
analyst's hope is to establish a set of classifications or categories that 
can be used to describe and predict legal phenomena in a scientific and 
value-neutral way. He preserves for other days the questions whether 
the law is good, whether it ought to be obeyed, what its origins are, 
what relation it bears to other social and cultural phenomena, and so 
on. 
This view of law is associated with the tradition of philosophic lib-
eralism that views society as comprised of a set of atomistic individu-
als, each of whom bears a set of rights, liberties, and duties, and who 
are related to one another through contractual relations and through 
the operations of the State. Such community as exists, on this theory, 
is formed on the principle of maximum respect for individual liberty. 
What ties us together is not our common values or desires or identity 
or sense of belonging but our respect for the other person's right to 
choose to do with his own what he will. 
t Copyright 1986 by James Boyd White. 
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All this has been subject to qualification and attack for some time, 
and the present symposium is an important stage in that process. 
Each of these writers is interested in expanding his or her range of 
vision beyond the relationship between the lawmaker and the direct 
audience of the lawmaker's commands to include the society and the 
culture in which the lawmaker and citizen are both embedded. The 
heading that unites these efforts is "Law and Community." 
This phrase has a wide range of possible meanings, of which I wish 
to focus on three. The first, and perhaps the most obvious, suggests 
that the relationship between law and the larger community is at heart 
reciprocal: the source oflaw is ultimately the community itself, which 
the law in tum serves to reinforce or reconstitute. The law is then seen 
as one of the ways in which the society and the culture remake them-
selves. This perception naturally erodes the sense that the law domi-
nates the world - or even creates it - and hence our confidence, 
otherwise so natural to lawyers, that we can judge a particular world 
by its laws. Power can speak and act through social conventions or 
private arrangements as well as through law, and the surface rational-
ity and fairness of a legal system may mask its radical injustices. For 
our own law to be "color blind" in its own categories, for example, 
would not erase but reinforce the racism that otherwise exists in our 
community. 
This perception also blurs the distinction between those who make 
and those who obey the law, enabling us to see law as a means of self-
regulation or self-constitution. In both respects it suggests that law 
can be properly understood - properly interpreted and properly criti-
cized - only as part of a larger cultural and social matrix. It is to the 
community, to the society and the culture, that we must look to un-
derstand the aims of legislation, the significance of judicial decisions, 
the meaning of sentences or even of particular words in legal dis-
course, the omissions or dominations that make law unfair, and so on. 
All of this opens up important lines of thought. 
Another meaning of law and community focuses on the fact that 
the law can itself be seen as a way of establishing a community of 
value and discourse among those who speak and act on its terms. This 
is a way of seeing the legal community as having its own principles of 
constitution and practice, its own social roles and values, its own cul-
ture. The ideals of the fair hearing, of the impartial judge, and of the 
trustworthy lawyer, for example, are ideals of the legal culture, and 
they are of first importance to the larger world as well. 
People who take the first point of view will find themselves asking, 
"What kind of community does the law help us to become as a whole 
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society?" Those who take the second point of view will ask, "What 
kind of community among legal actors does the law itself create, in its 
practices, institutions, and methods?" These are deeply related ques-
tions - one could hardly answer one without eventually addressing 
the other - but they do represent different points of departure. And 
they share a difficulty, which it will be my main object in the rest of 
these observations to address, namely that each approach presents us, 
in our science-ridden century, with the basic tension between ques-
tions of fact and those of value. 
The central question I have attributed to each approach - "What 
kind of community does the law make?" - is ambiguous in the sense 
that it is not clear whether it calls for what modern discourse would 
call an "empirical" or a "normative" response. ·For us, as modern 
intellectuals, factual questions are the safe ones:· we undertake to de-
scribe something, whether it is a social system, a series of cases, or the 
interaction between law and community, and in so doing we claim to 
make a contribution to knowledge. Even safer are questions of logic 
or reason, for they can remain wholly hypothetical: "If you say X, you 
must also be saying Y." Whether to say X, or not, is a wholly· different 
question. To evaluate, judge, or what I call criticize is for· us far more 
dangerous, for any act of criticism will be based upon values, and 
much of our current academic ideology - here the scientific and lib-
eral traditions reinforce each other - claims that "values" are inher-
ently suspect as "subjective" or "personal." On what ground can we 
claim the right to speak and be listened to on such subjects? The sci-
entific model of discourse writes out value judgments on the grounds 
that they cannot be talked about rationally - they are mere prefer-
ences; the liberal view of the relation between the individual and the 
State regards them as essentially private; and much modern philoso-
phy seeks to reduce them to a discourse that is itself conceptual and 
deductive, in which the speakers trace out the consequences of one 
position or another but do not argue about the primary commitments 
- often reduced to "intuitions" - upon which everything ultimately 
depends. 
But as the writers in this symposium demonstrate, and a moment's 
thought would also show, to talk "purely factually" is at once undesir-
able and impossible, especially about law and the questions law ad-
dresses. Who could ask either of the questions listed above without at 
least implicitly asking also what kind of community the law ought to 
help us to become, what kind of community the law ought to be? The 
question then remains: Upon what can this process of judgment and 
criticism be grounded, upon what understandings can it proceed? 
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It is this question that I wish to discuss here. It is an especially 
acute one because so many people fear, or seem to fear, that under the 
conditions of radical relativism that are thought to dominate modem 
life no cultural criticism is possible, or, perhaps worse, that any old 
criticism is as good as any other and that no serious and responsible 
judgments can be made on such subjects. My hope is to address and 
to allay this fear in a way that will suggest a set of questions that can 
usefully be brought to the papers that follow this one. 
II 
In many different ways, for a great many decades, it has been 
claimed that the great characteristic of the modem world is the col-
lapse of order. God is dead, or so we are told, and the fixed doctrines 
and traditional practices of religion no longer offer truths upon which 
we can confidently rely for a clear sense of ourselves, of our world, and 
of our duties. Science was once thought to promise a firmer ground, 
and some still think it does, but upon examination it too proves to be 
culturally determined and shaped, in some cases almost a form of po-
etry. From Darwin we discover that the categories of nature itself -
the species into which life is formed - are impermanent, constantly 
shifting, and that they carry us into a future we cannot possibly imag-
ine. Our psychological experience - the first and last datum of the 
neo-Cartesian skeptic - is shown by Freud to be delusive, incomplete, 
part of a larger structure of motive and meaning of which we can 
grasp only the dimmest outline. Wittgenstein shows us that language, 
the very material of our thought and the means of our expression, is 
contingent and variable, laden with meanings of which we are imper-
fectly aware and which we cannot wholly control, while Derrida and 
some of his followers offer to take us a step beyond that. We have 
come to see that our languages construct attitudes within each of us, 
not so much against our will as without reference to it, and over these 
processes we have little or no control. For us - in contrast, we think, 
to our predecessors - there is thus no transparent universal language, 
no authoritative medium of thought or expression, whether philosoph-
ical or academic, into which statements in other languages can confi-
dently be translated. Under these conditions, how can we have 
confidence in anything we see, anything we feel, anything we say, any-
thing we do? How can we possibly judge the worth of anything? 
For lawyers the perception that our minds and sentiments, and to 
some degree our selves, have been formed without our knowledge by 
the language and practices of the legal culture, and of the larger cul-
ture beyond it, is likely to be quite disturbing. It may even lead to a 
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kind of rebellion - "You are not going to get control of my mind," we 
say. But that does not quite work, at least not in such a simple way, 
for the "we" that is making this claim is in fact partly the product of 
the culture itself. That is the very fact being complained about. An-
other response is a kind of hatred of the culture for having marked the 
self - "I will be my own master" - irrespective of any judgments one 
might try to make about the merits of the particular culture. But this 
hatred of the culture, by virtue of the very fact that gives rise to the 
anguish, is also hatred of the self. 
All of this is especially difficult for the kind of person attracted to 
law, for we are by nature and training likely to be competitive, confi-
dent in the powers of analytic reason that have served us so well, and 
afraid of anything that looks like weakness. For many people, includ-
ing - or especially - academics, law is a field for conquest by asser-
tion and argument, almost a form of warfare. It can be very 
disturbing for us to realize that we do not have control over the power 
that we have at such cost given ourselves. Our own greatest achieve-
ment - and who would we be without it? - is in our eyes stained. 
What often results is a profound conflict, perhaps externalized in the 
form of a monotonous railing against an oppression of the self in 
which one is in fact complicitous. The mind insists on making things 
somehow different, but has no sense of any way to do that. Small 
wonder that people caught in this kind of situation feel, as we are told 
by The New Yorker that some law professors do at Harvard, that their 
"lives have been wasted."1 
What are we to say to the side of ourselves that feels this way? 
One possibility would be to defend our present legal and general cul-
tures on the merits, so that we can become reconciled to the fact that 
we are partly made by them - and made perhaps much better than 
we would be without those influences, if such a thing can be imagined. 
Another possibility would be to join in a kind of general and incoher-
ent revolt against the culture and the self. The strong version of the 
first response is pure authoritarianism, that of the second is pure nihil-
ism or anarchism, and for most of us neither of these is thinkable. 
Any other alternative requires discrimination and judgment, and thus 
that we face our central question: How we can have confidence in our 
capacity to judge the culture we inhabit? 
It is as a way of addressing that question that I believe the method 
of the humanities, which it will be my object in the rest of this paper to 
describe, has much to offer us. The central idea of this method is to 
1. Trillin, A Reporter at Large: Harvard Law, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 1984, at 53, 83. 
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see what can be learned from the experience of others who have simi-
larly struggled with their own versions of our common situation, espe-
cially as that experience has been preserved for us in the great texts of 
our own past. By reading them well, we can make them texts of our 
present too. 2 
A 
This raises the question how that learning is to proceed, but for 
some there may be a prior issue. The modem world is unique, one 
might say, and there are no relevant others to look to. The great 
works of philosophy and literature to which we might look for models 
are every one of them tainted by the dominant ideologies of their day, 
reproducing injustice even where they seek most to liberate. We are 
alone in a unique cultural situation and have nothing to learn from 
others: this is what it means to be a modem. 
I think this is simply wrong. The people of the past inhabited 
worlds that were in essentials as relativistic as our own. These men 
and women were partly made by the languages and cultures they grew 
up in, by the practices of social and intellectual life that created the 
world they knew. Yet in their compositions they partly remade or 
reconstituted these languages and practices. Their struggles with their 
languages can thus speak to us directly as we struggle with our own, if 
we can only educate ourselves enough to hear them. We can learn to 
participate in a cross-cultural conversation about the relationship be-
tween mind and language, between self and culture, and do so with 
minds often vastly superior to our own. It is to maintain the possibil-
ity of such a conversation that we preserve the works of our past and 
seek to educate our minds to understand and respond to them. 
B 
What actually marks the modem mind, I think, is not the collapse 
of order around it, as we are inclined to feel, but an extraordinary 
desire for an impossible certainty followed by an extraordinary despair 
when this desire is disappointed. One common response is a kind of 
nihilism, a claim of ultimate meaninglessness, made either in miserable 
despair or in the triumphant glee of an adolescent delighting in the fall 
2. This is the aim of my book, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND 
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984), in which I try to 
work out a way of reading that can connect such texts with our own world. In THE LEGAL 
IMAGINATION (1973), I address the same situation from a somewhat different perspective, that of 
the person who is learning law, feeling the power of the language upon him or her, and seeking 
ways to face that situation. This is where I address most fully what I mean by the "art" of which 
I speak below. 
June 1986] Cultural Criticism 1379 
of a figure of authority. A good deal of modern critical literature, in 
the law and elsewhere, is in fact directed against "authority" in all its 
forms and on behalf of the "individual," as though all authority were 
authoritarian and destructive of the self, as though we as individuals 
had nothing to gain from certain forms of authority, for our own in-
struction, limitation, and security. 
For me the supposed collapse of firm cultural structures is to be 
celebrated in a different way, not because I am eager to see such struc-
tures destroyed, but because in my view they never existed in the first 
place, at least not in the form in which they are thought to be lost. 
What we have lost is a false hope - a hope of fixity and certitude, 
derived from the promises and premises of modern science - which if 
realized would in fact reduce human responsibility and possibility to a 
very low level indeed. 
Surely Augustine knew that the world was not fixed and rationally 
knowable, and in their different ways, so did Socrates, Plato, and 
Milton. In fact every artist knows this, for, by the nature of his own 
work, he knows that the world we live in is largely constructed by us; 
that the culture that forms us is formed by us; that we are engaged in a 
constant conversation between the self and the world in which each is 
constantly being remade. Yet as the work of art itself repeatedly 
shows, life on such terms is not impossible, as we are inclined to fear, 
but rich with possibility. 
Such is the nature of life for the artist, and it is the nature of life for 
every human being as well. We are all artists, both in language and in 
the rest of life. We live on conditions of radical uncertainty and do so 
with success, and sometimes with ease. Starting from our first move-
ments in the arms of our parents, we make and manage our own social 
relations, as we learn about kindness and cruelty, truth and deception, 
about being heard and being ignored, about recognition and objectifi-
cation, about real conversation and manipulation, and so on. As we 
construct, and reconstruct, the narratives of our lives from their begin-
nings we make stories and histories, and as these histories are shared 
- as we make collective stories with others in our families and else-
where - we create and re-create communities and languages as well. 
Modern developmental psychology has taught us (if we needed to be 
taught it) that we do not so much learn our languages as invent them, 
partly out of the texts we hear, trying out new forms and seeing how 
they work, constantly experimenting. Invention is essential to all 
learning, from the very first moment of life, and it can remain a pres-
ent and active part of the intellect to the very end. 
At its center ours is a life of language and of art. This is the fact 
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that enables us to see other works of art as speaking to us, for they are 
made out of, and are about, our common situation. 
c 
To claim for our lives the quality of art and invention is of course 
not to say that we are totally free and unconstrained. Quite the re-
verse: art in every field is a way of addressing the limits as well as the 
resources of one's materials - the limits of one's social and cultural 
situation, of one's language, of one's mind. But it may be easier to 
accept the fact that we are in part the product of our culture, and 
limited by it, when we also see that we are not wholly determined by 
our circumstances, but retain important freedoms and capacities to 
modify them. Between two nonexistent opposites - total freedom 
and total constraint - we inhabit a ground that we must fill up by our 
own activity. 
To speak of art is to accept that we speak out of circumstances 
incompletely known and to others similarly situated. The artist knows 
that he or she will never have a perfect photograph of the relevant 
world with every detail in perfect focus, never the sort of representa-
tion science once dreamed of or aspired to. Instead, we always act in 
partial ignorance. In our makings we choose a subject, a direction, 
and a focus of attention; a starting point, a tone, and a set of terms; 
and we are responsible for what we choose. Some things and relations 
will be relatively clear, but always at the price of obscurity elsewhere. 
An important part of what we can teach each other is where to direct 
attention, how to focus it - and refocus it - in new ways. 
Think of the way we work out our capacity to judge works of art. 
Not by inducing from the instances provided by certain masterpieces 
eternal laws of aesthetic excellence which we can turn around and ap-
ply to other objects, as if all art objects existed out of time and culture 
on an enamelled laboratory table, waiting to be classified. Each work 
speaks to its own world, and is made out of the materials of that 
world: not only the physical materials, such as this particular ochre 
paint or that musical instrument or this array of words, but materials 
in a purer sense cultural: one's knowledge of the prior works of music, 
or painting, or poetry, or law, that have formed the expectations of 
one's audience, that have formed the audience itself, and which one 
must therefore take as one's starting point. Music is made not only 
out of musical notes and silences, but out of earlier music. All art is 
about its culture, its context, and should be understood and judged 
that way. 
As human beings we live on artistic and rhetorical, not scientific, 
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terms. In our most important expressions we argue not from premise 
to conclusion, but by making whole ways of talking - ways of being 
and of acting in language - which we offer each other for adoption, 
rejection, and modification. It is the modernist habit to turn our texts 
into sets of propositions - of fact, value, or logic - that can be inde-
pendently analyzed and judged. But little of our talk is propositional 
in that sense; far more often and deeply is it social and cultural. We 
persuade most fully by who we become in our practices of language, 
by who we invite others to become, by the languages we make and the 
experiences we offer: we persuade by performance to whole languages, 
not by argument to propositions. ("Here is my way: what is yours?") 
Whenever we speak to another we create a relationship with him 
or her, or a promise of one, and in doing this we affirm that this rela-
tionship can be analyzed and judged; likewise, whenever we speak we 
define a relationship with our language and affirm that this relation-
ship, this remaking, can also be analyzed and judged. In this sense 
what I have called cultural criticism is not something we should call 
on ourselves to start doing; it is something we already do, by implica-
tion and performance, whenever we seriously engage with the texts 
produced by another mind or make such texts of our own. 
III 
But to say this is to define a responsibility for us, in law and litera-
ture alike: How is this to be done well rather than badly? How are we 
to learn to engage in these processes and to judge what we make when 
we do so? What connection can there be between the discourse in 
which we engage and the community we constitute, and other worlds, 
constituted by other languages? 
A 
It is precisely to these questions that what I call the method of the 
humanities speaks. It tells us that our first step should be to turn to 
the greatest of human intellectual achievements - each of which is 
composed on conditions in essentials like our own - and learn to un-
derstand, and to admire or disapprove, the way another mind has 
transformed his language in a composition of his own and in so doing 
has established community with his reader. Exactly how this is to be 
done is an open question, to which a proper response requires detailed 
engagement in the process itself. My own most complete response is 
to be found in my own work of that kind, but this much at least can be 
said here, that what one learns in such a process is not a set of repeat-
able rules or maxims or portable insights, not a set of theories and 
1382 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1373 
arguments and conclusions, but a way of understanding and being. 
One learns not by what one is told, or even by what one is shown, but 
by the person one becomes in interaction with a text. That is its mean-
ing. This is true not only of poetic texts but of intellectual and argu-
mentative texts, even of judicial opinions. 
To put it in a phrase, I think that the study of the humanities is the 
central activity by which the responsive and critical mind can best be 
formed and tested, that it offers the ground upon which cultural criti-
cism can rest. In saying this I invoke, in an abbreviated way, the value 
of our cultural tradition, and this in two respects. In the first place, I 
mean to resist the modernist view that the history of culture is the 
history of progress, the incremental acquisition of knowledge and un-
derstanding, a history of which we stand at the momentary apex. 
While this may be true with respect to some, but by no means all, 
forms of technology - think of medieval stained-glass windows, for 
example, or the agricultural practices that we have lost in our own 
generation - it is, in my view, demonstrably not true with respect to 
other forms of understanding and action. One function of cultural tra-
dition, then, is that of a collective and selective memory, the preserva-
tion of the best we have done, which can serve to set standards by 
which to measure contemporary achievements and attempts. The tra-
dition not only expands those with whom we can readily converse, to 
include more than our own contemporaries, it can be taken as estab-
lishing a set of presumptions that can serve as a comprehensible and 
practical spur to our own education, individual and collective. 
The process of presumption works this way. Our predecessors 
have found the texts of Augustine or Dante, say, to be wonderful, 
beautiful, transforming, worth years of attention. Yet when we first 
read them perhaps we are put off, bored, certainly frustrated. But we 
tell ourselves that the presumption runs in favor of them, and against 
our first responses, that in reading and judging such texts as these -
as opposed to choosing toothpaste, underarm deodorant, or 
automobiles - consumer preference is not the whole of value; that we 
may need to work to put ourselves in a position to see what others 
have seen; and that we are in need of an education at the hands of 
others, from whom we have something important to learn. Such an 
attitude carries us into the text in a different way. Of course, the au-
thority of tradition is only presumptive, not final, and one must not 
abandon the ultimate responsibility of judgment. What one should do 
is meditate long before exercising it against the texts that have behind 
them the authority of our tradition. 
My point is not that we should think that because Shakespeare or 
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Sophocles said something it must be true, or even beautiful, or that we 
should convert our minds into empty vessels to be filled by what 
others have said, but rather that in our attempts to make sense of our-
selves and our cultures we should take advantage of texts that afford 
challenges and resources beyond the ordinary. The idea is not that we 
should erase our capacity for judgment but that we should educate it 
in a certain way. 
The presumption in favor of tradition is resisted not only by much 
science and social science (which all too often see history simply as 
progress), but by the strain of modern literary criticism that elevates 
the critic over the text and by the tendency in modern philosophy to 
talk as if no one even thought about philosophic problems before, or 
certainly not in as clear and powerful terms as we do. 
There is a second dimension to the process by which we make our 
past our own. Some of the partial inaccessibility of earlier minds and 
texts is itself cultural and linguistic: to understand the text we need to 
learn the language, the culture, and this requires us to learn what is 
initially foreign. This process is obviously difficult, and we may well 
resist it, but it has the great merit of taking us out of our own world to 
another, from which our own looks very different. What seems natu-
ral to us - the only way to see the world or to talk about it - can in 
this way come to seem cultural, contingent, chosen, and therefore sub-
ject to change. Our conversations with our cultural past can enable us 
to establish, not one true platform from which to see and judge our 
world, but a set of them, each somewhat different, related in time and 
cultural space. 
From this point of view anthropology of a certain kind has much 
to teach us about cultural criticism as well. I mean the kind of anthro-
pology that seeks to learn the language, the sentiments, the ways of 
being and seeing and acting of another culture, in order to hold them 
in the mind at once with our own languages and our own ways of 
being. (There is another kind of anthropology, which seeks to classify 
the phenomena of other cultures in its own terms, as though its grid of 
description and analysis were of universal validity.) But whether one 
reaches out to other cultures as an anthropologist, to see what can be 
learned from them, or back into our own, to uncover its foreign roots, 
this kind of work can be done only experientially, not theoretically. 
One's own mind must actually engage with the text and language, as a 
solitary organism responsible for its own perceptions and judgments. 
One cannot shortcut the process by reading the reports of others or by 
thinking of these matters at the level of theory. 
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B 
Of course this way of proceeding does not lead to certainty, or 
universal agreement, or scientific truth; indeed, it often leads to disa-
greement and misunderstanding. But disagreement is something we 
know how to address in conversation and to tolerate where conversa-
tion fails. This kind of work teaches us that we should continue to do 
what we have always done, which is to engage in the kind of conversa-
tion in which disagreements and misunderstandings are addressed, al-
ways imperfectly and always incompletely but not always without 
accession of understanding. Of course not all conversations go equally 
well. Implied in what I have said is that our attention must continu-
ously be given to the quality of the conversational process: to our 
openness to the views of another, to our willingness to revise our own 
terms, to our readiness to learn more fully the degree to which, when-
ever we speak, we say more than we mean or know. Who am I to you, 
and you to me? With what attitude toward each other and toward our 
languages do we speak? What are our voices? If we can get these 
things right, the rest of what we care about, or ought to care about, 
will follow. 
And how do we know when we have got them right? Not by ap-
plying to the conversation, to the dialogic relation, the very kinds of 
conceptual categories and desires for certainty from which we are try-
ing to escape, but by accepting the responsibilities that our actual ca-
pacities give us. We always work out of our present selves and present 
cultures, and there is no way for us to establish a platform from which 
to look at everything at once, no way to leave ourselves and attain 
some pure plane of unmediated knowledge. We can see or judge only 
one part at a time, or a few parts, and our vision and judgment alike 
are shaped by the rest of what we are. To the modernist mind this is 
all impossible, but to the humanist, to one who draws upon the exper-
iences of the past, upon other languages and cultures and upon ordi-
nary life, it is thoroughly familiar and secure. This is how we live and 
grow. 
One way to put the advantage of the method of the humanities -
for which I make not the faintest claim of originality, since it has been 
the dominant method of Western culture from the Iliad to a period 
within living memory - is to say that it provides us with a language of 
criticism, a language made up of the texts and languages of the past to 
which we have directed our collective attention. Without some such 
education we are stuck in the dichotomous position that characterizes 
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our era, either affirming or denying the authority of the moment, the 
language of the moment. 
* * * * * 
Our standards of judgment come not from a priori reasoning, then, 
or from theories, but from our own experience of life and of other 
people, including works of the sort I have mentioned. Of course, no 
one experience or work can stand as a perfect authority. We make 
sense of what we read as we make sense of life, by putting one tentative 
judgment together with another, one version of ourselves and our ca-
pacities together with another, seeing how it works out, trying it an-
other way, and so on, continually growing and changing by 
progressive incorporations and discardings. We know how to do this, 
for we have always done it. These are the processes of reciprocal inter-
action with other people, with language, and with nature by which we 
have formed our own identities. We have no deeper knowledge. 
The central image is that of autopoiesis, the organism making itself 
in interaction with its environment. In the process both organism and 
environment change. There is no one way the universe is constituted, 
no ultimate ontology upon which everything can be grounded. All 
species, all individuals, all languages and cultures and communities, 
are engaged alike in a process of reciprocal change. That change is not 
to be feared but welcomed. 
IV 
We start by learning languages and social relations in our interac-
tions with our families. Thereafter everything that makes sense to us 
does so only insofar as it makes sense in terms of what has gone before. 
A human life is made as a poetic or musical text is made, by unfolding 
out of itself; it is made out of its own origins and first growth, out of 
the opening line, the opening measures, against which everything that 
follows plays. As I suggested above, :then, it is not only our reading of 
the great texts that informs our minds but, prior to that and necessary 
to it, our ordinary experience of language and social relations. The 
center of our being is the set of social and cultural practices we have 
been learning and modifying since our birth. This is what connects 
the two sources of authority I describe, the great works of our own 
and other cultures, and the experience of language and of life by which 
we have made ourselves what we are. Both are modes of autopoetic 
interaction which, when made the subject of self-conscious attention, 
can lead to a conversational process in which we can have the right 
kind of confidence. 
These sorts of experience can teach us to make a ground between 
I 
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the two impossible extremes of authority and freedom: between grant-
ing total authority to a text or a set of texts (or to a set of people or 
institutions) and denying all authority external to the self. Our judg-
ments can be firm but provisional, as we gradually put together a char-
acter and an education for which we can claim some coherence, and 
do so both alone, in interaction with nature and culture, and socially, 
in discourse and community with others. We have much to learn from 
the past, and from others; we have much to teach the future, and to 
others. Our struggle for liberation is also a struggle ~or self-correction. 
As for law, it too partakes of the radical uncertainty of the rest of 
life, the want of firm external standards. But it is also a special way of 
living on these conditions, a way of making standards internally, out 
of our experience, as we make ourselves in our talk. The law is in fact 
a method of cultural criticism and cultural transformation, as well as 
cultural preservation. To turn for the moment to the realities of twen-
tieth-century life, I think that the law with all its faults has been by far 
the best and most powerful method of cultural criticism American so-
ciety has had. Certainly, it has proved more valuable than modern 
philosophy, sociology, political science, or journalism. The main rea-
son for this, as I say elsewhere, is that the law is in structure multivo-
cal, always inviting new and contrastive accounts and languages. 
To turn at the end from process to substance, from the way we 
make our standards to what they ought to be, we can ask: What do we 
learn when we turn to the experience of the past and the present and 
seek to discover ultimate standards of value? To answer that question 
by performance has been the object of my other work, which I can 
sum up by saying that for me the voice of our tradition is plain and 
plainly right. The object of human community, we have always 
known, is the recognition of the value of each person as a center of 
worth and meaning, as living in the kind of perpetual process of recip-
rocal interaction with nature, language, and other people through 
which each of us makes himself. In this we are at once the same and 
different: the same in the essentials of our situation - in our depen-
dence on culture and our need to remake it, in the creative center of 
our lives - but different in what we make, for each of us is ultimately 
unique. It is in fact upon this double truth that our equality rests: if 
we were wholly the same or wholly different we could disregard one 
another. As it is, our deepest obligation and highest hope is to create a 
world in which each person is recognized, in which each may achieve 
as fully as possible the realization of his or her capacities for life. That 
is easy to say and has often been said. The major difficulty is to give it 
meaning not at the level of concept or theory but in literary and intel-
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lectual practice, in our speech and conduct. To do so is in my view the 
central task of the judge and lawyer as well as the citizen, teacher, and 
person. 
All this is a way of suggesting a third meaning of "law and com-
munity": that our ground for criticism is the community we make 
when we write and speak to each other. 
